Frants Charnyshevich

A national opinion poll conducted in September by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) attested rather an unexpected fact: the number of partisans of the European integration surpassed the number of enthusiasts of the incorporation into Russia. The ratio between the latter and the former is 44% to 32%. Belarusian sociologists and journalists started at once looking for possible versions of these changes in the geopolitical consciousness but, thank God, refrained from deep-routed conclusions and long-term predictions, noting correctly that it would be better to wait at least till winter.
Experts are not surprised by the fact that a common Belarusian may get the idea of desiring a rapprochement with Europe even after having watched “Panarama”, the world’s most objective news magazine. It was enough to lower the degree of attacks at “Western democracies” in State-controlled mass media, and for the head of State to declare the willingness to see his “blue-eyed country” becoming a European one, as straight off the public opinion got friendlier to the European Union. It reminds a well-known joke about a Belarusian who caught a goldfish but he didn’t dare ask something substantial for himself. When the goldfish was astonished at her vis-à-vis’ behavior, the Belarusian asked perplexedly: “You mean that I could?”
In the last ten years or so the geopolitical consciousness of Belarusians proved to be too fluctuating. This fluctuation is being determined by the current political situation and attitude in the State media. Gas deliveries have been suspended, and we start gazing at Europe with burning interest; a credit has been issued, and we go to fraternal Russia. However, we do not do it on our own, but only after an approval from above. The head of IISEPS Professor Aleh Manajeu asserts that there is no solid basis yet in the society for shaping constant geopolitical orientations.
It is worth to examine changes in the public opinion through the perspective of recent meetings of a group of Belarusian journalists with representatives of the Polish political class which were organized by the Center for International Relations in Warsaw (CSM). The main message that was articulated by almost all Polish interlocutors – the success of cooperation in the framework of the Eastern Partnership depends on the desire of Belarusians themselves. Eugeniusz Smolar, patriarch of the Polish resistance and expert of the European Commission in matters of the Eastern policy, said directly – the European Union would not tow anyone against his own will. The desire of rapprochement must be expressed by both sides. On the Belarusian side, efforts of opposition alone are not sufficient because, in Smolar’s opinion, it has no substantial influence on the situation, does not voice aspirations of the great part of population and, thus, it cannot be regarded as a strategic partner. And a partner is needed because it is the only way to attain substantial changes in relations between Belarus and the European community.
After the failed policy of isolation which, inter alia, called for a partnership work with opposition circles namely, the Polish (and, in fact, not only Polish) diplomacy looks perplexed. In the opinion of Michal Kacevicz, observer from Newsweek, a quest for new foreign policy instruments in respect of Belarus is now under way. The issue of partner is probably the most delicate one in this context. Relations with representatives of the authorities are almost morally unacceptable for Polish government circles because after years of confrontation a dialogue on equal terms with Belarusian officials looks absurdly, especially if one takes into account the continued pressure on Angelika Borys’ supporters. However, it is the results of September poll that demonstrate once again the great degree of influence of the authorities on the geopolitical orientation of population. The stalemate is observed, and it means that unconventional decisions are needed, independently of how they will look from the point of view of the European standards and law.
The foregoing does not mean at all that Polish politicians reject the possibility of further cooperation with opposition. Politics are being done by the active part of population which partly belongs to opposition, and the State has a tremendous influence, primarily, on the passive part of the electorate. This is why the cooperation with opposition elite will go on, at least to persuade them into more pragmatic activities. However, Polish diplomats are more interested by the alignment of forces in government circles; they look for the Belarusian Gorbachevs and Yeltsins in order to assure themselves that changes, at least evolutionary, are possible. Such persons may become future partners.
In the meantime, it turns out that the Belarusian nation itself, the “source of power” as the Constitution provides it, is the most solid and reliable partner for the European Union and the United States. Brussels gets signals from Belarus that this very nation expressed its interest in Europe. Such signals must be caught and a quick reaction must be demonstrated, because it may turn out that it is the only propitious moment in the long-term perspective for a pivotal change in situation, even if these signals are a result of manipulation in the State mass media. The cooperation with such partner may be based on close contacts only, and the contact with common Belarusians may take place only when they, dwellers of villages and small towns, people with different views and professional qualifications, will be able to pass without any obstacles through the “Schengen Wall” that estranged the Belarusians from Europe. The issue of visa fees and procedures becomes a decisive one for the Polish and European diplomacy, because the positive decision may not only allow diplomats to save face, but also to determine the fate of the “Belarusian question” for Europe, not to mention Poland, for which the absorption of Belarus by Russia is the worst-case scenario.