Paviel Usau

There is no doubt that Poland is one of the most active geopolitical players in Eastern Europe. And it is not surprising because it is determined by historic traditions and its geographic location as well as by the internal political will. Aspirations to revive the former glory of Rzeczpospolita influence in large measure the geopolitical strategy of today’s Poland stipulating its relations with its eastern partners, primarily with Ukraine and Belarus.
During last several years Poland was able to build a more or less holistic concept of its eastern policy which is called just so, the “Eastern policy”. However, this concept is not limited exclusively by relations with the States which border Poland on the east, and namely Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. In accordance with this policy, establishment and development of relations with other countries of the former USSR, including the Caucasian and Central Asian States are also a priority for Poland. For example, Poland is one of the most loyal political allies of Georgia; President of the Polish Republic Lech Kaczyński visited Georgia twice in 2008. Poland also sticks consistently to a point-blank anti-Russian position on the issue of the August 2008 war in Georgia and sees Russia as a potential threat to former Soviet republics.
However, despite the multi-vector nature of the “Eastern policy”, relations with closest eastern neighbors, primarily with Ukraine and Belarus, remain of top priority. As it was already pointed out, it is explained not only by common borders but also by the formerly common historic past which is of utmost importance for today’s Poland. The territories of these countries are traditionally regarded as a part of the historic Polish State which were torn off by the long arm of fate, fell under the foreign influence and became independent “by a chance”.
Naturally that such belief is not an official point of view of Polish politicians, but nostalgia about lost territories is still clearly traced in actions and declarations of some Polish political activists.
One can say that the policy of Poland towards Belarus and Ukraine has two foundations. On one part, these countries are seen as partners, and on the other part, as former territories.
It is not for nothing that the phrase “kresy wschodnie” which means “eastern skirts” is frequently used to define the territories laying to the east of the Polish borders. It is a not quite convenient and disdainful definition for Belarus and Ukraine which is not objective and means province and backwardness. In other words, the category “kresy” tunes in to some extent with notions “former”, “ours”, which demand a return or, at least, our “Polish” presence. At the same time, the own independent and majestic history of these States which composed the Great Duchy of Lithuania some time ago is very often forgotten, as well as the fact that Rzeczpospolita was far from being a result of the historic activity of the Polish nation but of joint efforts of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.
“Kresy-ness” in the geopolitical strategy of Poland means restitution of its cultural and political influence on the formerly annexed territories which are now independent republics, and also, if possible, restriction of influence of other political forces on these territories and their inclusion in its own domestic zone of influence.
During last several years the notion “kresy-ness” included such component as “political ignorance” of the society, or “absence of democracy”, or its weakness in the neighboring eastern countries.
Indeed, authoritarianism and political chaos became a new reality for Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. In consequence of political transformations and geopolitical movements Poland became the State on whose borders the Western democratic civilization ends. Being at the boundary between democracy and authoritarianism, Poland formulated a new goal and got a new mission. This mission consists not only in the restitution of its influence on the territory of Belarus and Ukraine but also in promotion of democratic values and transformations in these States.
“Messianic” ideas grew in momentum after Poland’s accession to the European Union when it put one more mission on its shoulders – to “Europeanize” the eastern regions. Poland became the geopolitical gate for Ukraine and Belarus in their dialogue with Europe and began to play the role of arbiter in relations between the European Union and Lukashenka’s regime. In essence, Poland took on the job of an EU representative in the dialogue with eastern neighbors and often it receives with indignation some decisions taken in Brussels in circumvention of Polish interests and expectations.
Increasing its activity at the eastern direction, Poland earns its European capital seeking to take its place on the international arena on a par with such States as Germany, France, and the Great Britain.
Thus, democratization and Europeanization of Belarus and Ukraine are the main tasks of the Polish “Eastern policy”. However, Belarus and Ukraine act in this case not as a subject and a partner in relations but as an object which is unable to solve its own domestic problems without foreign interference.
Moreover, Belarus and Ukraine became a field of virtual geopolitical battles between Poland and Russia where Poland appears not as a representative of European interests but rather as a mouthpiece of its own historic ambitions. The traditional historic and political conflict with Russia determines to a great extent the general strategy of the “Eastern policy” in which one may see the mission to extricate former Soviet republics out of Russia’s influence. This position was formulated once and for all in the Polish foreign policy only during the last five to six years after the power in the country passed into hands of conservatives and liberals.
It is also worth noting that increase in Poland’s activities at the eastern direction is linked in a greater degree with the fact that other EU countries, primarily, countries of “old Europe” are not interested at all in what happens to the eastern neighbors. The only exception is Russia which “old Europe” cannot ignore and thus prefers not to quarrel with.
The only problem which attracts attention of the European Union as a holistic mechanism is the issue of energy security. It is just this problem which is still the thread that links Ukraine and Belarus to Europe at least somehow. It may be suggested that if the issue of diversification of energy supplies to Europe was decided Belarus and Ukraine would get much less attention. Recurrent energy wars of Ukraine and Belarus with Russia make the European Union to expedite the adoption of another energy strategy. However, after this strategy is adopted Belarus and Ukraine may lose whatsoever interest the European Union now has in them.
One way or the other, the resultant political and geopolitical vacuum was quickly filled by new EU members: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Lithuania. However, difference in opinions of old and new EU members about the situation in Eastern European countries precludes them from working out a common and single strategy of relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia.
Namely the fact that “old Europe” has already got “tired” from “Eastern problems” and seeks to tackle its own domestic tasks, relegating the Belarusian and Ukrainian issues on the back burner, facilitates shaping of another mission and task of Poland. But now this mission does not regard only Belarus and Ukraine but is also directed towards Europe – the European Union. And the goal of this mission of Poland is to serve the idea of the “single Europe and European civilization”, whose part Ukraine and Belarus should be. Poland became a peculiar mouthpiece of Belarusian and Ukrainian problems, reminding the “old Europe” that its eastern neighbors are a part of Europe and they cannot be simply blacked out of the European map or be used to create a buffer zone, or be given to Russia’s sphere of influence (which would be a simpler solution for “old Europe”).
This is why creation of the Eastern Partnership became to some extent a reflection of “messianic” aspirations of today’s Poland.
However, Poland is not the only ambitious player in the region. Lithuania has similar goals and objectives, seeking to establish its influence and play the leading role within the boundaries of the formerly united Great Duchy of Lithuania.
However, neither Poland nor any other State can withstand the imperialistic ambitions of Russia without a single and coordinated Eastern European strategy of the European Union. Russia has much more money and possibilities to influence former Soviet republics.
Nevertheless, despite ambitions and messianism of the Polish Republic, it remains an important and most promising partner of Belarus in its relations with the European Union. If the domestic political situation changes in Belarus the country may count on the comprehensive assistance of its western neighbor.